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PROTECTING ACCESS TO EXTRACURRICULAR ACTIVITIES: 
THE NEED TO RECOGNIZE A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO A 
MINIMALLY ADEQUATE EDUCATION 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Extracurricular activities provide an important source of education 
for high school students. According to former President Ronald Reagan, 
extracurricular activities afford students "valuable opportunities to 
discover and develop talent in areas other than those covered within the 
classroom." 1 Indeed, empirical research shows that extracurricular 
activities have a far-reaching and positive impact on schoolchildren? 
Students who participate in high school extracurricular activities, for 
example, are more likely to have good school attendance records, high 
grade-point averages, and aspirations for education beyond high school.3 
Also, students who participate in extracurricular activities are less likely 
to engage in a variety of risky behaviors.4 These school-sponsored 
activities occupy students' idle time, strengthen their commitment to 
school, and expose them to beneficial peer and adult influences.5 
In addition, participation in high school extracurricular activities 
may be an indicator of future career achievement.6 Students who are 
I. Exec. Prod. 5109,48 Fed. Reg. 44749 (Sept. 30, 1983). 
2. Br. of Amici Curiae Am. Acad. of Pediatrics et al. at 9, Bd. ofEduc. of lndep. Sch. Dist. No. 
92 of l'ottawatomie County v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002) (citing jacquelynne S. Eccles & Bonnie L. 
Barber, Student Council, Volunteering, Basketball, or Marching Band: What Kind of Extracurricular 
Involvement Matters?, 14 j. Adolescent Research 25 (1999) (finding "clear evidence" that 
participation in extracurricular activities provides higher than expected GPAs)); joseph L. Mahoney 
& Robert B. Cairns, Do Extracurricular Activities Protect Against Early School Dropout?, 33 Dev. 
Psycho!. 241 ( 1997) (finding that participation in extracurricular activities protects against early 
school dropout). 
3. Natl. Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, Extracurricular Participation and Student Engagement 
<http:/ in ccs.ed.gov/pubscarch/pubsinfo.asp?pubid=957 41 > (June 1995) [hereinafter Extracurricular 
Participation J. 
4. Nicholas Zill, Christine Winquist Nord & Laura Spencer Loomis, Adolescent Time Use, 
Risky Behavior and Outcomes: An Analysis of National Data <http:/ /aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/cyp 
/xstirnusc.htm> (Sept. 11, 1995). 
5. !d. 
6. Br. of Amici Curiae, supra n. 2, at 9; Natl. Fedn. of St. High Sch. Assns., The Casef(Jr High 
School A clivi ties <http:/ /www.nths.org/ scriptcontent/V a_ custom/va_cm/ con ten tpagedisplay.cfm? 
content_lll=l63> (accessed Mar. 23, 2004). 
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involved in such activities are more likely to succeed at their chosen 
professions and make positive contributions to their communities. 7 On 
the other hand, students who do not participate are 57 percent more 
likely to drop out of high school by the time they are seniors, 49 percent 
more likely to have used drugs, 37 percent more likely to have become 
teen parents, 35 percent more likely to have smoked cigarettes, and 27 
percent more likely to have been arrested.8 
Given the proven benefits that come from participation in 
extracurricular activities, it is no surprise that 99.8 percent of the nation's 
high schools offer some variety of these educational activities. 9 About 80 
percent of high school seniors participate in at least one of the 
extracurricular activities offered at their schools. 10 Therefore, it is 
apparent that the term "extracurricular activities" is a misnomer. 
Instead, it is more appropriate to consider such activities as a standard 
and integral part of a student's education rather than imply that they are 
unimportant and supplementary. 
Despite widespread participation in high school extracurricular 
activities and the myriad of benefits derived from them, the United States 
Supreme Court has twice ruled that a school district may limit or 
condition access to these important educational opportunities. First, in 
Vernonia School District 47! v. Acton, 11 the Court upheld a school policy 
that conditioned the opportunity to participate in interscholastic athletics 
on a student's submission to random urinalysis drug testing. 12 Next, in 
Board of Education of Independent School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie 
County v. Earls, 13 the Court expanded the reach of Vernonia by 
upholding the constitutionality of a policy that required all students who 
participate in any extracurricular activity to submit to a drug-testing 
regime. 14 
Placing such a prerequisite upon extracurricular participation can 
have the dire result of depriving certain schoolchildren of important 
educational opportunities whether or not they are using illegal drugs. 15 
7. The Case for High School Activities, supra n. 6. 
8. Zill, supra n. 4. 
9. Extracurricular Participation, supra n. 3 (Extracurricular offerings include participation in 
various school publications, performing arts, athletics, honor societies, student government, 
academic clubs, vocational clubs, service clubs, and hobby clubs.). 
10. Id. 
11. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47] v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995). 
12. ld. at. 652-66. 
13. Ed. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 
(2002). 
14. Id. at 837-38. 
15. See Br. of Amici Curiae, supra n. 2, at 4, 20. Non-drug users may choose not to participate 
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Faced with the decision of whether to submit to drug testing or foregoing 
extracurricular activities, schoolchildren are forced to engage in a crude 
cost-benefit analysis. They must decide whether their participation in 
extracurricular activities is worth tolerating an intrusion upon their 
privacy. 16 The records of Earls and other cases plainly suggest that some 
students will opt not to be subjected to a drug test at the expense oflosing 
their eligibility for involvement in extracurricular activities. 17 
The Supreme Court was able to rule the way it did in Vernonia and 
Earls because education is not yet considered to be a fundamental right. 18 
A statute or rule that infringes on a fundamental right is subject to 
heightened scrutiny by the courts. 19 As such, interference with a 
fundamental right will only be tolerated where the government employs 
necessary means to address a "compelling state interest."20 Thus, the 
policies in Vernonia and Earls would likely have been struck down if the 
Court had previously recognized a fundamental right to education that 
encompassed extracurricular activities. 21 Instead, the Court allowed two 
school districts to deprive certain students of access to educational 
in extracurricular activities because they find that the administration of a drug test infringes too far 
upon their sense of modesty and privacy. Id. at 19-21. For example, some students who were 
subject to the policy in Earls "expressed embarrassment over the drug-testing procedure." Earls v. 
Bd. Of Educ. of Tecumseh Pub. Sch. Dist .. 115 F. Supp. 2d. 12S1, 1291 (2000), rev'd, 536 U.S. 822 
(2002) [hereinafter Tecumseh]. Those students who do in fact use drugs may also choose to refrain 
from participation in extracurricular activities instead of submitting to a drug-testing regime. Br. of 
Amici Curiae, supra note 2, at 20. justice Ginsburg noted in her Earls dissent that "even if students 
might be deterred from drug use in order to preserve their extracurricular eligibility, it is at least as 
likely that other students might forgo their extracurricular involvement in order to avoid detection of 
their drug use." 536 U.S. at 853 (Ginsburg, J ., dissenting). 
16. Br. of Amici Curiae, supra n. 2, at 19-20. 
17. The Tecumseh record shows that one student told a teacher that she chose to stop 
participating in choir because of the drug-testing policy. 115 F. Supp. 2d at 1291 n. 38. See also 
Penn-Harris-Madison Sch. Corp. v. Joy, 768 N.E.2d 940, 943-44 (Ind. App. 2002) (Students refused to 
sign consent form for random, suspicionless drug testing required to participate in extracurricular 
activities or to receive a parking permit.); Weber v. Oakridge Sch. Dist. 76, 56 P.3d 504, 506 (Or. App. 
2002) (student who chose not to consent to random urinalysis testing prevented from playing on 
volleyball team); Trinidad Sch. Dist. No. I v. Lopez, 963 P.2d 1095, 1097 (Colo. 1998) (student 
suspended from participation in marching band because he chose not to consent to the school's 
mandatory drug policy); Tannahill ex rei. Tannahill v. Lockney Ind. Sch. Dist., 133 F. Supp. 2d 919, 
922-23 (N.D. Tex. 2001) (refusal to consent to drug testing resulted in suspension from all 
extracurricular activities); Acton v. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47], 796 F. Supp. 1354, 1359 (D. Or. 1992), 
vacated, 515 U.S. 646 (1995) (seventh grade student who refused to sign a consent form for drug and 
alcohol testing prohibited from participation in district-sponsored athletics). 
18. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I, 35 (1973) (Education "is not 
among the rights afforded explicit protection under our federal Constitution. Nor do we find any 
basis for saying it is implicitly so protected.") [hereinafter San Antonio]. 
19. Russell W. Galloway, Jr., Basic Substantive Due Process Analysis, 26 U.S.F. L. Rev. 625, 627 
(1992). 
20. !d. 
21. See infra Part V. 
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opportunities that would have provided them with short- and long-term 
benefits. Since the Earls decision in June 2002, school districts across the 
country have implemented policies that call for urinalysis testing of 
students for the use of drugs, alcohol, and even tobacco. 22 As a result, an 
increasing number of students, whether or not they use illicit substances, 
are being blocked from access to activities that would enrich their lives. 
Despite its rulings in Vernonia and Earls, the Supreme Court, has 
explicitly left open the possibility that some minimal level of education is 
in fact constitutionally protectedY The Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment provides a constitutional basis for the 
recognition of this right. 24 In addition, the recent decision in Lawrence v. 
Texas 25 demonstrates a new willingness by the Court to interpret the 
Due Process Clause more broadly to protect rights that are not explicitly 
enumerated in the Constitution.26 Hence, should the Court be 
confronted again with the question of whether the Constitution 
guarantees a right to education, it is now more likely to recognize a 
fundamental right to a minimally adequate education. 
While some commentators have argued for the recognition of a 
fundamental right to a minimally adequate education, 27 they have not 
addressed the important issue of whether extracurricular activities would 
be protected by the acknowledgment of this right. This Note will 
demonstrate why the Supreme Court should recognize a fundamental 
right to a minimally adequate education. This Note will also argue that 
this fundamental right should be broad enough to protect students' 
access to extracurricular activities. Part II details the treatment of 
education as a fundamental right under state and federal law. Part III 
suggests that the Court may now be ready to recognize this right in the 
wake of the Lawrence decision. Part IV points to the constitutional bases 
for the recognition of a fundamental right to a minimally adequate 
education. Part V defines the scope of this right to include 
22. See Tamar Lewin, With Court Nod, Parents Debate School Drug Tests, N.Y. Times AI 
(Sept. 29, 2002); see also Greg Giuffrida, Urine Tests Jar Tobacco Use, <http:/ /www.cbsncws.com/ 
stories/2002/10/08/national/main524640.shtml> (Oct. 8, 2002). 
23. The Court did not dismiss the possibility "that some identitlable quantum of education is 
a constitutionally protected prerequisite to the meaningful exercise of either I the right to speak or the 
right to vote!." Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265,284 (1986) (quoting Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 36). 
24. See infra Part IV. 
25. Lawrence v. Texas, I 23 S. Ct. 2472 (2003). 
26. Id. at 2484 (holding that the liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosexual 
persons the right to choose to enter into relationships in the contlnes of their homes and their own 
private lives and still retain their dignity as free persons). 
27. See e.g., Kristen Safier, The Question of a Fundamental Rigilt to a Minimally Adequate 
Education, 69 U. Cin. L. Rev. 993 (2001); Thomas). Walsh, Education as a Fundamental Right Under 
the United States Constitution, 29 Willamette L. Rev. 279 (1993). 
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extracurricular activities. Part VI concludes by urging the Supreme 
Court to recognize a fundamental right to a minimally adequate 
education in order to protect fully the educational opportunities of the 
nation's schoolchildren. 
II. EDUCATION AS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT 
Public education is largely the province of state and local 
governments.2H While the U.S. Constitution does not explicitly mention 
education, most state constitutions contain clauses concerning 
education.29 These education clauses point to the importance of 
education and the role of the state government in providing education to 
its citizens.30 More than half of the forty-odd states that have addressed 
the issue have concluded that their state constitutions guarantee a 
fundamental right to education. 31 Interpretations, however, of the scope 
of this right vary from state to state.32 
Unfortunately, state-based education rights do not adequately 
safeguard the educational opportunities of the nation's schoolchildren. 
While only a handful of states have interpreted the education clauses of 
their constitutions to protect access to extracurricular activities to some 
extent,33 a large majority of state courts have rejected this notion.34 The 
limited reach of state constitutional rights to education has enabled 
school districts to create barriers to accessing extracurricular activities. 
In Earls, for example, a school district conditioned such access upon a 
student's submission to drug testing.35 
The recognition that the U.S. Constitution guarantees a fundamental 
right to a minimally adequate education that encompasses 
extracurricular activities would provide students with the necessary 
28. Victoria ). Dodd, Practical Education Law for the Twenty-First Century 21 (Carolina 
Academic Press 2003). 
29. Jd. at 121. 
30. Jd. 
31. Victoria). Dodd, A Critique of the Bush Education Proposal, 53 Admin. L. Rev. 851,866 
(20()]) (citing e.g., Washakie County Sch. Dist. No. One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo. 1980); 
Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971), superceded, Crawford v. Huntington Beach Union High 
Sch. Dist., 98 Cal. App. 4th 1275 (2002)). 
32. See infra Part V. 
33. See e.g., Grabow v. Montana High Sch. Assn., 59 P.3d 14, 17-18 (Mont. 2002) ("Students 
clearly have the right to participate in extracurricular activities. That right to participate in 
extracurricular activities is a right that is subject to constitutional protection.") (internal citations 
omitted). 
34. Dodd, supra n. 28, at 251. 
35. Earls, 536 U.S. at 838. 
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protection. 36 Indeed, if the Supreme Court recognizes such a right, the 
educational opportunities of students will be protected regardless of the 
state in which they attend school. 
A. The Importance of Fundamental Rights 
The Fourteenth Amendment, in part, prohibits states from depriving 
"any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."37 
Courts utilize the Due Process Clause as a vehicle to engage in a 
substantive review of state statutes that restrict individuals' freedom of 
action. 3s 
The level of scrutiny that a court applies in its evaluation of a law 
depends on the nature of the right upon which the regulation infringes.39 
If a statute regulates economics or matters of social welfare, for example, 
the courts will apply only a minimal level of scrutiny.40 Under this 
standard of judicial review, a statute is constitutional so long as it is 
rationally related to a legitimate interest of the government. 41 Hence, a 
court will uphold economic and social welfare laws unless it finds that 
the legislature has "acted in an arbitrary and irrational way."42 
If, however, a law regulates the exercise of fundamental rights and 
liberties that are explicitly or implicitly protected by the Constitution, the 
courts will apply a test of strict judicial scrutiny. 43 A court applying this 
heightened standard will give much less deference to the legislative 
body.44 To withstand the strict-scrutiny test, a law that abridges a 
fundamental right will be found unconstitutional unless it has been 
narrowly tailored by the legislature to serve a compelling state interest.45 
36. See infra Part V. 
37. U.S. Const. amend. XIV. 
38. john E. Nowak & Ronald D. Rotunda, Constitutional Law 382 (5th ed., West 1995). 
39. In U.S. v. Carotene Prods. Co., justice Stone, in his famous Footnote Four, succinctly stated 
that legislation is subject to a "more searching judicial inquiry" when it affects a fundamental right. 
U.S. v. Carotene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-153 n. 4 (1938). Stone opined that "[t]hcre may be 
narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its 
face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendmen ls, 
which are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth." ld. See also 
Milton R. Konvitz, Fundamental Rights: History of a Constitutional Doctrine 148-52 (Rutgers 200 I). 
40. Nowak, supra n. 38, at 383. See also Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., 34il U.S. 483, 487-
88 (1955); Fergus(m v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726,731-32 (1963). 
41. Nowak, supra n. 38, at 383. 
42. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 83 (1978) (quoting Usery v. 
Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15 (1976). 
43. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 17-19. 
44. Nowak, supra n. 38, at 383-84. 
45. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973); see also Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 
621, 627 (1969); Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479, 485 ( 1965); Erwin Chernerinsky, Constitutional 
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Under this two-tier approach, even if the court identifies a compelling 
state interest for enacting a regulation, it will not uphold the statute 
unless the state's objective cannot be achieved in a less burdensome 
way.1(' Consequently, a court applying strict scrutiny is much more likely 
to render a statute unconstitutional than a court applying a lesser level of 
scrutiny. 
The level of scrutiny that a court employs in evaluating the 
constitutionality of a particular piece of legislation plays a vital role in the 
determination of whether the law will be upheld or struck down. As 
such, determining which rights are "fundamental," and thus trigger strict 
scrutiny, is of immense importance. The Fourteenth Amendment's Due 
Process Clause provides heightened protection against governmental 
interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests that are 
not specifically enumerated in the Constitution or its Amendments.47 
The Supreme Court has described fundamental rights as those rights that 
are "'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition,' ... and 
'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' such that 'neither liberty nor 
justice would exist if they were sacrificed."'48 The Court has determined 
that the Due Process Clause gives fundamental-right status to the right to 
marry, the right to have children, the right to direct the education and 
upbringing of one's children, the right to enjoy marital privacy, the right 
to use contraception, the right to maintain bodily integrity, and the right 
to have an abortion.49 While the Court has historically been reluctant to 
recognize new fundamental rights imbedded in the Due Process Clause,50 
Law: Principles and Policies 529 (Aspen L. & Bus. 1997). 
46. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 51; Dunn v. Blumenstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972). It should be 
noted that the Rodriguez and Dunn cases involved equal protection, rather than substantive due 
process analysis. Nonetheless, the courts should use the same standards of review regardless of 
whether they are employing a substantive due process or equal protection review. Nowak, supra n. 
38, at 383. 
47. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,720 (1997); see also Nowak, supra n. 38, at 387. In 
his famous dissenting opinion in Lochner v. N.Y., Justice Holmes suggested that certain rights 
deserve heightened protection from legislative intrusion: 
I think the word liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment is perverted when it is held to prevent 
the Jutural outcome of a dominant opinion, unless it can be said that a rational and fair man 
necessarily would admit that the statute proposed would infringe fundamental principles as 
they have been understood by the tradition of our people and our law. 
19R U.S. 45, 76 (I '!OS) (Holmes,)., dissenting); see also Konvitz, supra n. 39, at 15. 
Indeed, a "fair and enlightened system of justice" would be impossible if the nation's citizens were 
denied certain fundamental rights. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,325 (1937), rev'd in part 
on other grounds, Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 ( 1969). 
48. Washington, 521 U.S. at 720-21 (quoting Moore v. City of E Clcvel.md, 431 U.S. 494, 503 
(1977)); Palko, 302 U.S. at 325-26. 
49. Washington, 521 U.S. at 720 (internal citations omitted). 
50. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194-95 (1986), overruled, Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 
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its recent decision in Lawrence v. Texas suggests a new willingness by the 
Court to recognize protections not explicitly written into the text of the 
Constitution. 5 1 
B. Education as a Fundamental Right under the U.S. Constitution 
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that "education provides the 
basic tools by which individuals might lead economically productive lives 
to the benefit of us all."52 Indeed, an adequate public education is 
necessary to prepare our nation's citizens to "exercise the role of self-
government," and to produce the well-trained and educated workforce 
upon which our economic system relies. 53 
In Brown v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court found that racial 
segregation in public schools deprives schoolchildren of equal 
educational opportunities in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.54 Chief Justice Warren's majority decision 
stressed the significance of education to the nation's children and society 
as a whole: 
[E]ducation is perhaps the most important function of state and local 
governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great 
expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the 
importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in the 
performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in 
the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today 
it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in 
preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to 
adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that 
any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied 
the opportunity of an education. 55 
This view of education is consistent with that of prior and 
subsequent Supreme Court decisions. For example, in Meyer v. 
Nebraska, 56 the Court noted that "[t]he American people have always 
regarded education and [the] acquisition of knowledge as matters of 
supreme importance .... " 57 Furthermore, the Court's decision in 
2472 (2003); Washington, 521 U.S. at 720. 
51. See infra Part lll(B). 
52. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,221 (1982). 
53. Elizabeth Reilly, Education and the Constitution: Shaping Each Other and the Next 
Century, 34 Akron L. Rev. I, 1-2 (2000). 
54. Brown v. Rd. ofl.!duc. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483,493-95 (1954). 
55. I d. at 493. 
56. Meyer v. Neb., 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923) (invalidating a state law that prohibited the 
teaching of foreign languages to young children). 
57. ld. 
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Wisconsin v. YodersH pointed out that "some degree of education is 
necessary to reasonably prepare citizens to participate effectively and 
intelligently in our political system if we are to preserve freedom and 
independence."5Y 
Despite the Court's stated high regard for education, it has repeatedly 
refused to elevate education to the status of a fundamental right. In San 
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, the Supreme Court 
specifically held that there is no fundamental right to education.611 The 
Court found that Constitution does not explicitly or implicitly provide 
for such a right. 61 The 5-4 decision upheld Texas' unequal school 
financing system, which provided more funding to schools in districts 
with higher property taxes. 62 Because the Court declined to recognize 
education as a fundamental right, the Texas law was subjected to, and 
survived, only a minimal level of judicial scrutiny. 63 The Court rejected 
the argument that education is essential to the effective exercise of other 
constitutional rights, such as the right to free speech and the right to 
vote.64 The Rodriguez decision evinces the Court's fear that the 
recognition of a fundamental right to education would create a slippery 
slope where more and more unenumerated rights would have to be 
acknowledged.65 Certainly, such a decision would raise the possibility of 
the Court having to recognize fundamental rights to other necessities, 
such as housing, food, or employment.66 
In Plyler v. Doe, the Supreme Court reiterated its position that 
education is not entitled to fundamental-right status.67 However, Justice 
Brennan's majority opinion noted that education is not "merely some 
governmental 'benefit' indistinguishable from other forms of social 
welfare legislation."6H The Plyler Court went on to strike down a Texas 
statute that denied a free public education to the children of illegal 
SH. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972) (exempting Amish students, on religious 
freedom grounds, from a state requirement to attend school until the age of sixteen). 
59. !d. 
60. 411 U.S. at 35. 
61. !d. 
62. /d.at11-12. 
63. Sec Safier, supra n. 27, at 1003 (noting that "the undisputed importance of education will 
not alone cause this Court to depart from the usual standard for reviewing a State's social and 
economic legislation." Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35). 
64. !d. at 35-37. 
65. See id. at 37. 
66. See id. ("How ... is education to be distinguished from the significant personal interests in 
the basics of decent food and shelter?"). See also james E. Ryan, The Supreme Court and Public 
Schools, H6 Va. L. Rev. 1335, 1392 (2000). 
67. 457 U.S. at 221. 
oK hi. 
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aliens.69 In reaching its decision, the majority relied on "the innocent 
nature of the children," whose parents brought them into this country, 
and on the importance of education. 70 The Court did not employ strict 
scrutiny, but it used a heightened level of judicial review to analyze the 
Texas statute.71 Under this "intermediate" level of review, the law was 
declared unconstitutional because it denied certain children of a basic 
education without furthering a "substantial state interest."72 Even so, the 
enhanced scrutiny utilized by the Court in Plyler was dependent upon the 
specific facts of that case/3 and the Court has declined to extend its 
rationale to other cases?4 
The Court's repeated failure to recognize a fundamental right to 
education has paved the way for decisions, such as Vernonia and Earls, 
which enable states to enact legislation that significantly infringes on 
schoolchildren's educational opportunities. While Plyler acknowledges 
that education is more than a mere governmental benefit/5 the decision 
does little to safeguard the education of children who do not find 
themselves in the unique position of the children in that case. Until some 
minimum level of education is formally granted constitutional 
protection, students will be left without a sufficient judicial mechanism 
to challenge laws that ultimately restrict them from achieving their full 
educational potential. 
III. Two RAYS OF HOPE 
While the Supreme Court's jurisprudence regarding education has 
had the effect of depriving some students of important educational 
opportunities, there is room to remedy the situation. First, the Court has 
never conclusively determined whether there is some minimal degree of 
education that is indeed fundamentaF6 Second, the decision in Lawrence 
may demonstrate the Court's new approach to fundamental rights 
analysis, which increases the probability that additional fundamental 
69. I d. at 230. 
70. See Ryan, supra n. 66, at 1393. 
71. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 223-24. 
72. Id. at 230. 
73. The alien children that were harmed in Plyler were brought to the United States by their 
parents. The Texas statute penalized them for the actions of their parents. See id. at 220. 
74. See Ryan, supra n. 66, at 1394-95. The Supreme Court has not extended Plyler "beyond 
the 'unique circumstances' that provoked its 'unique confluence of theories and rationales."' 
Kadrmas v. Dickson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450, 459 (1988). 
75. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221. 
76. See infra Part III(A). 
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rights, such as a right to education, will be acknowledged.77 
A. The Door Left Open 
The Rodriguez and Plyler decisions declared that education is not a 
fundamental right. 78 However, in Plyler, the Supreme Court found that a 
complete denial of access to education is unconstitutionaJ.79 Therefore, 
the issue of whether the Constitution protects some minimal degree of 
education remains open today. Indeed, in Papasan v. Allain, the Court 
noted that Rodriguez and Plyler indicate that it "has not yet definitively 
settled the questions whether a minimally adequate education is a 
fundamental right and whether a statute alleged to ... infringe that right 
should be accorded heightened ... review."80 
In Rodriguez, the Court upheld a Texas school financing system and 
declared that education is not a fundamental right. 81 However, Justice 
Powell's majority opinion twice implied that there might be a 
fundamental right to a minimally adequate education. First, the decision 
observed that Texas provided "an adequate base education for all 
children" and suggested that the statute might be deemed 
unconstitutional if some children were excluded from access to school 
altogether.82 Second, the Court noted that there was no meaningful 
disparity in school funding between Texas' different districts, and hinted 
that the statute might be struck down if such a disparity existed.83 Justice 
Powell opined that " [ e ]ven if it were conceded that some identifiable 
quantum of education is a constitutionally protected prerequisite to the 
meaningful exercise of [the right to speak or the right to vote], we have 
no indication that the present levels of educational expenditures in Texas 
provide an education that falls short."M Furthermore, the majority 
explained that there is 
no basis for finding an interference with fundamental rights where only 
relative differences in spending levels are involved and where ... no 
charge fairly could be made that the system fails to provide each child 
77. See infra Part III(B). 
78. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 223; Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35. 
79. See Ryan, supra n. 66, at 1393. 
80. Papasan, 478 U.S. at 285. See also Kadrmas, 487 U.S. at 467 n. I (Marshall, J., dissenting) 
("In prior cases this Court explicitly has left open the question whether a deprivation of access [to a 
minimally adequate education] would violate a fundamental constitutional right. That question 
remains open today.") (internal citations omitted). 
81. Rodriguez,4ll U.S.atll-12,35. 
82. I d. at 25 n. 60; see Ryan, supra n. 66, at 1392. 
83. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 36-37. 
84. Jd. 
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with an opportunity to acquire the basic minimal skills necessary for 
the enjoyment of the rights of speech and of full participation in the 
political process. xs 
Based on this reasoning, the Court might be willing to recognize a 
fundamental right to a minimally adequate education if it were 
confronted with a case where some children were deprived of the 
opportunity to acquire a basic education. 
In Plyler, the Supreme Court struck down, on equal protection 
grounds, a Texas statute that denied a free public education to children of 
illegal aliens. 86 At first glance it would appear that the Plyler Court had 
the opportunity to recognize a fundamental right to an adequate 
education and declined to do so. Indeed, the Court confronted a statute 
that completely denied some children access to a basic education. 
Instead of recognizing a fundamental right, however, the Court applied 
an intermediate level of scrutiny.87 
It is important to remember, however, that the children affected by 
the Texas statute were undocumented aliens in violation of federallaw,Kx 
and that such status is not a constitutional irrelevancy.x9 For example, 
undocumented aliens cannot be treated as a suspect class for the purpose 
of triggering strict scrutiny in an equal protection analysis. 90 Similarly, 
the Court may not have been comfortable recognizing a new 
fundamental right in a case that dealt with the opportunities of those who 
were in this country illegally. Nonetheless, the idea of a complete denial 
of education to certain children, whose illegal status was brought about 
by their parents, did not sit well with the Court.91 
Since undocumented aliens are not considered a suspect class, the 
Court relied on the importance of education in order to employ a 
heightened standard of judicial review. 92 The majority opinion noted 
that education is more than a mere governmental benefit, and that it "has 
a fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of our society."93 The Court 
further stated that "[b ]y denying ... children a basic education, we deny 
them the ability to live within the structure of our civic institutions, and 
foreclose any realistic possibility that they will contribute in even the 
85. Id. at 37. 
86. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230. 
87. I d. at 218 n. 16,223-24. 
88. !d. at 205. 
89. I d. at 223. 
90. Jd. 
91. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 223-24. 
92. Jd. 
93. Id. at 221. 
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smallest way to the progress of our Nation."94 Notably, this reasoning 
highlights the significance of education to society, and demonstrates the 
Court's willingness to elevate its judicial scrutiny of laws that seriously 
infringe upon a child's educational opportunities, even without formal 
recognition of a fundamental right.95 
In sum, the reasoning in Rodriguez and Plyler, as acknowledged in 
Papasan, indicates that the Supreme Court has not foreclosed the 
possibility of recognizing a fundamental right to a minimally adequate 
education. 
B. A Roadblock Removed 
When the Supreme Court issued its decision in Bowers v. Hardwick, 
it placed a barrier on the path to the future recognition of new 
fundamental rights through the Due Process Clause. In that case, the 
Court held that the Constitution does not confer a fundamental right 
upon homosexuals to engage in consensual sodomy.96 According to the 
majority, proscriptions against sodomy have ancient roots that pre-date 
the birth of the United States.97 Furthermore, until 1961, all fifty States 
outlawed the practice.98 Hence, the Court stated, a homosexual's right to 
engage in sodomy cannot be considered '"deeply rooted in this Nation's 
history and tradition' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."'99 
Most importantly, the Bowers Court declared that it was not 
"inclined to take a more expansive view of [its] authority to discover new 
fundamental rights imbedded in the Due Process Clause." 100 Justice 
White's majority opinion states: 
The Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it 
deals with judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable 
roots in the language or design of the Constitution . . . . There should 
be, therefore, great resistance to expand the substantive reach of [the 
Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments], 
particularly if it requires redefining the category of rights deemed to be 
fundamental. Otherwise, the Judiciary necessarily takes to itself further 
authority to govern the country without constitutional authority. 101 
94. /d. at 223. 
95. See id. at 223-24. 
96. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192. 
97. I d. at 192. The majority noted that sodomy was considered a criminal offense by the laws 
of the original thirteen States when they ratified the Bill of Rights. Jd. 
98. /d. at 193. 
'19. !d. at 194. 
100. /d. 
10 I. /d. at 194-'15. 
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While Bowers clearly demonstrated the Supreme Court's 
unwillingness to recognize new fundamental rights, there is some 
question as to whether the decision would have actually prevented the 
Court from recognizing a fundamental right to a minimally adequate 
education. The Court decided Bowers on June 30, 1986. 102 One day later, 
the Court decided Papasan v. Allain. 103 That opinion, which was also 
written by Justice White, clearly stated that the Court had yet to 
determine whether there is a fundamental right to a minimally adequate 
education. 104 Therefore, one could argue that Bowers was not intended to 
bar the possible future recognition of a fundamental right to a minimally 
adequate education. Considering that both opinions were written by 
Justice White within such a short period of time, if such a restriction 
were to be imposed Justice White would likely have mentioned it in 
Papasan. 
In Lawrence v. Texas, the Supreme Court removed any possible 
barrier that Bowers might have presented to the recognition of a 
fundamental right to a minimally adequate education by explicitly 
overruling Bowers. 105 Lawrence involved an almost identical set of facts 
as Bowers. Police officers were dispatched to a private home in response 
to a reported weapons disturbance. 106 They entered Lawrence's 
apartment and observed him engaging in a sexual act with another 
man. 107 The two men were arrested and eventually convicted for 
violating a Texas statute that prohibited "deviate sexual intercourse with 
a member of the same sex." 108 The Texas Court of Appeals rejected the 
defendants' constitutional arguments under the Equal Protection and 
Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, 109 and relied on 
Bowers to uphold the convictions. 110 The Supreme Court seized the 
opportunity to readdress Bowers and granted certiorari. 111 
The Lawrence majority expanded the scope of the Due Process 
Clause to include a homosexual's right to engage in private, consensual 
102. /d. at 186. 
103. Papasan, 478 U.S. at 265. 
I 04. I d. at 285. 
105. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2484 ("Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is not 
correct today. It ought not to remain binding precedent. Bowers v. Hardwick should be and now is 
overruled."). 
106. I d. at 2475. 
107. Id. at 2476-77. 
108. I d. at 2476. 
109. I d. 
110. !d. 
Ill. I d. 
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homosexual activity without the intervention of the government. 112 In 
reaching this conclusion, the opinion rejected the assumptions on which 
the Bowers decision rested. The Bowers Court pointed to historical 
proscriptions against sodomy to find that sexual conduct between 
members of the same sex is not a right that is "deeply rooted in this 
Nation's history and tradition," and, therefore, is not fundamental.m To 
the contrary, the Lawrence Court stated that there is no longstanding 
history in this country of laws directed against homosexual conduct as a 
distinct matter. 114 According to the majority, state laws targeting same-
sex couples do not possess "ancient roots." 115 In reality, no state singled 
out same-sex relations for criminal prosecution until the 1970s, and only 
nine states have ever done so. 116 Furthermore, the majority criticized the 
Bowers Court's reliance on the historical Judea-Christian condemnation 
of homosexual practices.117 
Significantly, Lawrence notes that "our laws and traditions in the past 
half century are of most relevance" in determining whether a right is 
fundamental. 11 H Accordingly, in the view of the Court, an examination of 
legislation and public attitudes during the most relevant time period 
reveals "an emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial protection 
to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters 
pertaining to sex." 119 The Court's new willingness to look more 
searchingly into the nation's recent past, as opposed to clinging to ideals 
that were predominant when the Constitution was drafted, suggests that 
additional fundamental rights might be recognized as the attitudes of the 
nation evolve over time. Indeed, it now appears that the Court may 
acknowledge fundamental rights that are "deeply rooted" in the United 
States' history and tradition of the past half century. 
The significance of the Lawrence decision stretches far beyond the 
new protections given to homosexuals. The decision reveals the Supreme 
Court's new approach to fundamental rights analysis. In dissent, Justice 
Scalia correctly noted that the Court did not declare that homosexual 
sodomy is a fundamental right. 1211 Hence, strict scrutiny was not 
112. Id. at 2484. 
113. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192-94. 
114. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2478. Early American sodomy laws were not directed at 
homosexuals, but instead sought to prohibit non procreative sexual activity regardless of the gender 
of those involved. !d. at 2479. 
115. !d. at 2479. 
116. Id. 
117. I d. at 2480. 
118. Id. 
119. Id. 
120. !d. at 2488 (Scalia, )., dissenting). 
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triggered. The Court instead applied a rational-basis test to strike down 
the Texas sodomy statute. 121 Notwithstanding, the majority opinion 
represents a shift away from the slippery-slope concerns that were 
evident in Bowers and Rodriguez. 122 According to the Lawrence majority: 
Had those who drew and ratified the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth 
Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment known the components of 
liberty in its manifold possibilities, they might have been more specific. 
They did not presume to have this insight . . . . As the Constitution 
endures, persons in every generation can invoke its principles in their 
own search for greater freedom. 123 
As such, the Lawrence Court announced its current prerogative to 
interpret the Constitution and the Due Process Clauses more broadly in 
order to protect the liberties of the nation's citizens. A majority of the 
Court has now rejected the philosophy of Bowers, 124 which preached 
resistance to expanding the body of rights deemed to be fundamental. 125 
The Lawrence decision demonstrates that the Supreme Court is open 
to the possibility of recognizing new fundamental rights when they are 
"deeply rooted" in the history and tradition of the past half century. The 
Court's attitude has clearly changed since it addressed the question of a 
fundamental right to education in Rodriguez and Plyler. Therefore, 
should the Court again be faced with the issue, it is now more likely that 
it will find that the right exists to some extent. 
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS FOR THE RECOGNITION OF THIS 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT 
The Fourteenth Amendment, in part, prohibits the states from 
depriving "any person oflife, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law."126 Any examination of "fundamental rights under the Due Process 
Clause of the U.S. Constitution involves interpreting the word 
'liberty."' 127 Given the broader view of "liberty" expounded by the 
Supreme Court in Lawrence v. Texas, 128 there are two likely bases upon 
121. I d. at 2484. 
122. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 37 (expressing concern that if a fundamental right to education 
were recognized, the Court may be compelled to recognize other significant personal interests, such 
as rights to decent food and shelter). 
123. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2484 (emphasis omitted). 
124. Id. 
125. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 194-95. 
126. U.S. Const. amend. XIV. 
127. Walsh, supra n. 27, at 285. 
128. See supra Part lll(B). 
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which the Court could find a fundamental right to a minimally adequate 
education. First, the Court could determine that this fundamental right 
is implicit in the other rights that are expressly protected by the 
Constitution or the Bill of Rights. 129 Second, the Court could find that a 
right to a minimally adequate education is "deeply rooted in this Nation's 
history and tradition" such that "neither liberty nor justice would exist" if 
the right was not recognized. 130 
A. Penumbras and Emanations 
In Griswold v. Connecticut, the Supreme Court held that privacy is a 
fundamental right. 131 Like the right to education, the right to privacy is 
not specified in the text of the Constitution. However, according Justice 
Douglas's majority opinion, "[s]pecific guarantees in the Bill of Rights 
have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help 
give them life and substance."132 The Griswold opinion declared that the 
explicitly protected rights of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth 
Amendments implicitly formed the fundamental right of privacy. 133 
Indeed, the Court found that "[t]he right of privacy is an 'emanation' 
from the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights, which are incorporated 
into the 'liberty' of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment." 134 
The Rodriguez Court declined to apply Griswold's reasoning to 
education, despite the argument that education is essential to the 
effective exercise of other constitutional rights, such as the right to free 
speech and the right to vote. 135 However, the theory that the right to 
education is implicit in other enumerated rights deserves further 
consideration. Rodriguez was a 5-4 decision that contained several 
strong dissenting opinions. 136 As such, the Court's determination 
regarding the right to education, in the words of one scholar, "is not an 
impregnable fortress incapable of being successfully attacked."137 
Moreover, shifts in the Supreme Court's makeup and its attitude toward 
129. See infra Part IV(A). 
130. See injr·a Part IV(B). See also Washington, 52! U.S. at 720-21 (quoting Moore, 43! U.S. at 
494). 
131. 3Hl U.S. at 4H4-85. 
132. !d. at 484. 
133. !d. at 481-85. Sec also Walsh, supra n. 27, at 286. 
134. Konvitz, supra n. 39, at 114; see Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484. 
135. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35-37. 
136. Timothy D. Lynch, Education as a Fundamental Right: Challenging the Supreme Court's 
Jurisprudence, 26 Hof,tra L. Rev. 953, 992 (1998). 
137. Id. 
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fundamental rights analysis could lead it to reverse Rodriguez. 13x 
The Lawrence decision evinces such a shift. With Lawrence the 
Court eliminated the slippery slope concerns that highlighted the 
Rodriguez Court's rejection of the Griswold-like argument that the right 
to education stems from other enumerated rights. 139 Hence, if the Court 
were presented with question of a fundamental right to a minimally 
adequate education today, the Court might be more likely to agree with 
Justice Marshall's dissent in Rodriguez. In Rodriguez, Marshall reasoned 
that "[a]s the nexus between the specific constitutional guarantee and the 
nonconstitutional interest draws closer, the nonconstitutional interest 
becomes more fundamental and the degree of judicial scrutiny applied 
when the interest is infringed ... must be adjusted accordingly."140 
Several specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights require some amount 
of education before they can be effectively exercised. 141 Hence, the Court 
may rely on Griswold's "penumbras" doctrine to find a fundamental right 
to a minimally adequate education. Certainly, one could argue that some 
degree of education is a necessary prerequisite to the exercise of the right 
to speak and the right to vote. 142 The right to speak may be considered 
meaningless unless the speaker is able to articulate his or her thoughts 
intelligently and persuasively. 143 Similarly, citizens cannot effectively 
utilize their right to vote if they do not possess some level of reading and 
reasoning skills. 144 In addition, the Fourth Amendment protects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures by requiring a warrant describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 145 Some 
degree of education is necessary for a citizen to determine whether a 
warrant is valid. 146 Likewise, some quantity of education is required to 
exercise the First Amendment right to "petition the Government for a 
redress of grievances." 147 
In sum, Griswold provides a basis for the recognition of a 
fundamental right to a minimally adequate education. Although the 
138. See id. 
139. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 37. 
140. Id. at 102-03 (Marshall,)., dissenting). 
141. See Walsh, supra n. 27, at 286. 
142. These arguments were rejected in Rodriguez. 411 U.S. at 35. However, as discussed, the 
Court might now take a different stance in the wake of the Lawrence decision. 
143. Id. at 35. 
144. I d. at 35-36. The Court has noted that "some degree of education is necessary to prepare 
citizens to participate effectively and intelligently in our open political system if we are to preserve 
freedom and independence." Yoder, 406 U.S. at 221. 
145. U.S. Const. amend. IV. 
146. Walsh, supra n. 27, at 286. 
147. U.S. Const. amend. I. See Walsh, supra n. 27, at 286. 
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Rodriguez Court rejected the argument that certain enumerated rights 
form a fundamental right to education, the attitude of the current Court, 
as evidenced by its decision in Lawrence, suggests that it might, if asked, 
find that some amount of education is indeed deserving of fundamental 
rights protection in order to safeguard the exercise of specifically 
guaranteed rights. 
B. Education is Deeply Rooted in The Nation's History and Tradition 
The Court may also find a fundamental right to a minimally 
adequate education using a historical approach. Fundamental rights are 
those rights that are '"deeply rooted in this Nation's history and 
tradition,' and 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,' such that 
'neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed."' 148 A brief 
look at the nation's early history evinces the central role of education in 
the traditions of American society. 149 For example, some early 
seventeenth century colonies required local governments to establish 
schools that taught reading and writing. 150 By the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, many colonial and state constitutions contained 
language guaranteeing a right to education for all children within a 
state. 151 Shortly after Massachusetts established the first compulsory 
education system in 1837, most states followed Massachusetts' lead and 
created similar systems. 152 
Although evidence of the important role of education dates to pre-
independence colonial times, the Supreme Court might still find that 
public education was not "deeply rooted" in our history and tradition 
when the Constitution was ratified. Despite the early origins of public 
education in America, 153 the public was largely unreceptive to 
involvement in education when the Constitution was signed. 154 Even as 
recently as 1910, only 6 percent of the nation's population had completed 
high school. 155 Hence, the Founders' silence regarding education, 
coupled with limited participation in available schooling, might indicate 
that the Founders did not consider education to be a guaranteed right of 
148. Washington, 52! U.S. at 720-21 (internal citations omitted). 
149. See Dodd, supra n. 31, at 863. 
150. See id. (citing Jenkins v. Andover, !03 Mass. 94, 97 (1869) (explaining history and public 
utility of public schools)). 
151. Dodd, supra n. 28, at 9. 
152. Id. 
153. See Dodd, supra n. 31, at 863. 
154. See Walsh, supra n. 27, at 288. 
155. Dodd, supra n. 28, at 9. 
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the people. 156 According to this line of reasoning, education, therefore, 
cannot be considered to be so "deeply rooted" as to be deemed 
fundamental. 157 
Nonetheless, the Lawrence majority's view of fundamental rights 
analysis indicates that the Court would be more likely to find education 
to be "deeply rooted," and thus fundamental, if and when it addresses the 
issue again. As shown above, Lawrence indicates that the Court now 
believes that the nation's "laws and traditions in the past half century are 
of most relevance" in determining whether a fundamental right exists. 158 
It is clear that education has played a fundamental role in the lives of 
Americans over the past fifty years. In 1954, the Brown Court declared 
the importance of education to a democratic society,159 writing: "[I]t is 
doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if 
he is denied the opportunity of an education." 160 In Plyler, the Court 
labeled education as playing "a fundamental role in maintaining the 
fabric of our society."'"' Even the Rodriguez decision noted the 
significance of education to society and the Court's "historic dedication 
to education."162 Additionally, in considering whether there is a 
fundamental right to education under their state constitutions, more 
than half of the forty-plus states that have addressed the issue have 
declared that such a right exists. 163 Hence, it is foreseeable that at some 
point in the future, a majority of states will have recognized a 
fundamental right to education under state law. 164 Such a development 
would demonstrate the important place of education in the United States 
and might influence the Supreme Court to recognize a federal 
fundamental right to education. 165 
Most illuminating, however, is current statistical research showing 
that 87 percent of the nation's children obtained a high school degree in 
2000. 166 Notably, approximately 91 percent of eighth-grade children in 
156. Walsh, supra n. 27, at 288. 
157. Id. ("[O]ur early historical experience contravenes the notion of education as a 
fundamental right."). 
158. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2480. 
159. 347 U.S. at 493. 
160. Id. 
161. 457 U.S. at 221. 
162. 411 U.S. at 30. 
163. Dodd, supra n. 31, at 866. 
164. Id. 
165. Id. 
166. U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, Trends in the Well-Being of America's Children 
& Youth 2002 325 <http://aspe.os.dhhs.gov/hsp/02trends/EAl.pdf> (accessed jan. 22, 2004). 
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the United States attend a public, rather than a private, school. 167 As 
such, the dependence of schoolchildren on public education clearly 
demonstrates that the system of public education is now "deeply rooted" 
in this nation's traditions and history and should be recognized as 
fundamental. 16R 
V. EXTRACURRICULAR ACTIVITIES ARE PART Of A MINIMALLY ADEQUATE 
EDUCATION 
The Supreme Court's decisions in Vernonia and Earls enable school 
districts to enact policies that interfere with schoolchildren's access to 
extracurricular activities. 169 Such policies can have the result of depriving 
certain students of important educational opportunities. 170 Therefore, 
the scope of a fundamental right to a minimally adequate education 
should be broad enough to encompass extracurricular activities. 171 The 
recognition of such a right would afford students protection from the 
types of policies that were upheld in Vernonia and Earls. 172 
A. Defining the Right 
Although the Supreme Court has left open the possible recognition 
of a fundamental right to a minimally adequate education, 173 it has said 
little to define the possible bounds of such a right. 174 It is clear, however, 
that extracurricular activities have a significant presence in the lives of 
schoolchildren across our nation. Approximately 99.8 percent of our 
nation's high schools provide some type of extracurricular activity. 175 
These offerings include participation in various school publications, 
performing arts, athletics, honor societies, student government, academic 
clubs, vocational clubs, service clubs, and hobby clubs. 176 About 80 
167. Dodd, supra n. 28, at 10. 
16H. See Walsh, supra n. 27, at 292 ("[T]he value of public education in the minds of the 
American people has developed beyond what it was at the adoption of the Constitution. That value 
has now become so much a part of our historical experience that it should be considered a 
fundamental right."). 
169. See supra Part I. 
170. See id. 
171. See infra Part V(A). 
172. See infra Part V(B). 
173. See supra Part Ill(A). 
174. Saficr, supra n. 27, at 1009. Note, however, that the Court has indicated that "allegations 
of a funding disparity alone would not be sufficient to show educational inadequacy." Id. (citing 
Papasan, 478 U.S. at 266). 
175. Extracurricular Participation, supra n. 3. 
176. !d. 
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percent of high school seniors participate in at least one of these 
activities. 177 According to the National Federation of High School 
Associations, "[s]tudents participating in a number of [extracurricular] 
activities not only achieve better academically but also express greater 
satisfaction with the total high school experience than students who do 
not participate." 178 Indeed, "eliminating the opportunity for such 
participation eliminates the last link to fostering a sense of belonging to 
school that some students have." 179 Hence, extracurricular activities 
should be encompassed within the fundamental right to a minimally 
adequate education if, and when, the Court recognizes this right. 
State court decisions that consider educational adequacy may shed 
light upon the possible scope of a fundamental right to a minimally 
adequate education. 180 Unlike the U. S. Constitution, most state 
constitutions contain a clause pertaining to education. 181 These 
education clauses vary in language from state to state. 182 One of the most 
influential state court cases dealing with the interpretation of an 
education clause was decided by the Supreme Court of Kentucky in Rose 
v. Council for Better Education. 183 Regardless of the exact language of the 
state education clause in question, most state court adequacy decisions 
have taken the Rose interpretation into consideration when making their 
decisions. 184 The Rose Court defined the right to an adequate education 
as follows: 
[A]n efficient system of education must have as its goal to provide each 
and every child with at least the seven following capacities: (i) sufficient 
oral and written communication skills to enable students to function in 
a complex and rapidly changing civilization; (ii) sufficient knowledge of 
economic, social, and political systems to enable the student to make 
177. Id. 
178. The Case for High School Activities, supra n. 6. 
179. john H. Holloway, Extracurricular Activities: The Path to Academic Suaess?, 57 Educ. 
Leadership 87, 88 (Dec. 1999) (citing Susan Gerber, Extracurricular Activities and Academic 
Achievement, 30 ). Research & Dev. in Educ. 42,50 (Fall 1996)). 
180. Safier, supra n. 27, at 1009. 
181. Dodd, supra n. 28, at 121. 
182. Erin E. Buzuvis, "A" for Effort: Evaluating Recent State Education Reform in Response to 
judicial Demands for Equity and Adequacy, 86 Cornell L. Rev. 644, 654 (2001 ). More than half of the 
state education clauses mandate a threshold level of educational quality. Some clauses specifically 
identify subjects upon which the state's education system should focus. Other state constitutions 
contain clauses emphasizing the purpose and importance of education. Finally, some constitutions 
include specific provisions for nondiscrimination, accessibility, and uniformity. I d. 
183. Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989). 
184. Buzuvis, supra n. 182, at 655; see also Kelly Thompson Cochran, Beyond School Financing: 
Defining the Constitutional Right to an Adequate Education, 78 N.C. L. Rev. 399, 413 (2000) (labeling 
the Rose interpretation of a minimally adequate education as "a prototype for other state courts 
around the country"). 
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informed choices; (iii) sufficient understanding of governmental 
processes to enable the student to understand the issues that affect his 
or her community, state, and nation; (iv) sufficient self-knowledge and 
knowledge of his or her mental and physical wellness; (v) sufficient 
grounding in the arts to enable each student to appreciate his or her 
cultural and historical heritage; (vi) sufficient training or preparation 
for advanced training in either academic or vocational fields so as to 
enable each child to choose and pursue work intelligently; and (vii) 
sufficient levels of academic or vocational skills to enable public school 
students to compete favorably with their counterparts in surrounding 
states, in academics or in the job market. 185 
415 
The Rose decision outlined the goals of an adequate system of 
education. While most state courts that have addressed the issue have 
concluded that a state-based fundamental right to education does not 
encompass extracurricular activities, 186 it appears that those opportunities 
should fall within the protection of the minimal adequacy level defined in 
Rose. "Extracurricular activities provide a channel for reinforcing the 
lessons learned in the classroom, applying academic skills in a real-world 
context, and thus may be considered part of a well-rounded 
education." 187 For example, extracurricular activities foster the 
communication skills that enable students to function in our society by 
placing them in situations that enhance their social skills. 188 
The Rose court declared that an adequate education should also 
prepare schoolchildren for advanced educational training and 
competition in the job market. 189 Indeed, extracurricular involvement is 
integral to those who wish to continue their academic training. A 
student's participation and success in extracurricular activities is an 
important factor in the admission process for most colleges and 
universities. 19° Furthermore, certain extracurricular activities, such as 
185. Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 212. 
186. Dodd, supra n. 28, at 251. 
187. Extracurricular Participation, supra n. 3. 
188. Exec. Procl. 5109, supra n. I; The Case for High School Activities, supra n. 6; Holloway, 
supra n. !79. 
189. 790 S.W.2d at 212; see also Trinidad, 963 P.2d at !109 (noting that "the reality for many 
studcnb who wish to pursue post-secondary educational training and/or professional vocations 
requiring experience garnered only by participating in extracurricular activities is that they must 
engage in such activities"). 
190. See e.g. Harvard College Admissions, FAQS, <http://www.admissions.college.harvard.edu/ 
faqs/adnmsions/ app_polsi> (accessed jan. 13, 2004) (stating that "leadership and distinction in 
extracurricular activities" are part of Harvard's admissions criteria); N.Y. U. Admissions, 
<http://admissions.nyu.edu/before/index.php> (accessed jan. 13, 2004) (stating that the New York 
University Admissions Committee considers extracurricular activitie,; when reviewing application 
for admission); U.C.L.A. Undergraduate Admissions and Relations with Schools, Freshman Admission 
Process <http://www.admissions.ucla. edu/Prospect/Adm_frifradms.htrn> (accessed jan. 14, ?004) 
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Future Farmers of America, teach students vocational skills that they can 
use to enter the workforce directly after high school. 191 In sum, 
extracurricular activities provide students with several of the educational 
opportunities that the Rose Court sought to protect, and thus should be 
included within this definition of a minimally adequate education. 
vVhile many state courts have used Rose as a guide to define the scope 
of an adequate education, some have taken a more conservative 
approach. 1 ~2 For example, in Abbeyville County School District v. State, 19 ' 
the Supreme Court of South Carolina propounded a narrower definition 
of a minimally adequate education. 194 According to the Abbeyville court, 
an adequate education system provides students "with adequate and safe 
facilities and the opportunity to learn to read, write, and speak English, to 
acquire knowledge of mathematics, physical science, economic, social 
and political systems, history, governmental processes, and academic and 
vocational skills." 195 Extracurricular activities would also fall within this 
more limited definition of a minimally adequate education because they 
teach academic and vocational skills that cannot be taught in the 
classroom. 196 
Upon recognition of a fundamental right to a minimally adequate 
education, the federal judiciary will have to define its scope.IY7 Rose and 
other state court cases, such as Abbeyville, can serve as a preliminary 
guide for the federal courts as to the goals the fundamental right should 
protect. 198 In addition, the Supreme Court has already demonstrated its 
view on the role of education. According to the Court, public schools are 
"the primary vehicle for transmitting 'the values on which our society 
rests."' 199 Furthermore, "some degree of education is necessary to 
(stating that U.C.L.A. considers "exceptional achievement" in extracurricular activities when 
determining admissions); Binghamton U. Freshmen Information <http://admissions.binghamton.edu 
/freshmen.html> (accessed jan. 25, 2004) ("[SUJ\Y Binghamton's] Undergraduate Admissions 
Committee evaluates each application for both academic and non-academic strengths. [W]e 
look closely at a student's extracurricular activities and community involvement, leadership abilities, 
intellectual curiosity, and the qualities that make each student unique."). 
191. National FFA Organization, Mission Statement <http://www.ffa.org/media/news/ 
alger/downloads/ppt/student_parent-mac.ppt#2> (accessed jan. 14, 2004) ("[l'utun: brmers of 
America] makes a positive difference in the lives of students by developing their potential t(>r 
premier leadership, personal growth and career success through agricultural education."). 
192. Safier, supra n, 27, at 1014. 
193. Abbeyville County Sch. Dist. v. State, 515 S.E.2d 535 (S.C. 1999). 
194. See Safier, supra n. 27, at 1014; Abbeyville, 515 S.E.2d at 540. 
195. Saller, supra n. 27, at 1014. (citing Abbeyville, 515 S.E.2d at 540). 
196. See supra n. IR4; Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 212; Exec. Prod. 5109, supra n. I. 
197. Safier, supra n. 27, at 1019. 
198. !d. 
199. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221 (citing Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68,76 (1979)). 
393] ACCESS TO EXTRACURRICULAR ACTIVITIES 417 
prepare citizens to participate effectively and intelligently in our open 
political system .... "200 The Court has also noted that "education 
provides the basic tools by which individuals may lead economically 
productive lives .... "201 As such, the definition of a fundamental right to 
a minimally adequate education should provide schoolchildren with the 
assurance that they will receive a level of training necessary to achieve the 
goals of education previously expounded by the Supreme Court. 
Further, extracurricular activities, which provide students with a 
myriad of benefits202 and are inherently educational,203 should be 
encompassed within the right. Such activities are crucial, both to 
students who enter the workforce directly after high school and to those 
who move on to college. Indeed, these activities teach social and 
vocational skills that are crucial to future economic success and 
enjoyment in life.204 
Finally, it should be noted that there appears to be support on the 
bench to include extracurricular activities within the definition of a 
fundamental right to a minimally adequate education. Justice Ginsburg 
stated in her Earls dissent that "[p] articipation in [extracurricular 
activities] is a key component of school life, essential in reality for 
students applying to college, and, for all participants, a significant 
contributor to the breadth and quality of the educational experience."205 
As such, the fundamental right to a minimally adequate education, when 
and if adopted by the Court, should include within its scope the 
opportunity to participate in extracurricular activities. 
B. Greater Protection for the Nation's Schoolchildren 
The recognition of a fundamental right to a minimally adequate 
education that encompasses extracurricular activities will protect 
schoolchildren from the type of state policies that were upheld by the 
Supreme Court in Vernonia and Earls. Indeed, a school district would 
not be able to implement a drug-testing regime that has the ultimate 
effect of depriving students of the opportunity to participate in 
extracurricular activities. If a district enacted such a policy, a student 
would be able to bring a substantive due process challenge in federal 
200. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 221. 
201. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221. 
202. See supra Part I. 
203. The Case for High School Activities, supra n. 6. 
204. Exec. Prod. 5109, supra n. 1. 
205. Earls, 53fi U.S. at 845 (Ginsburg,)., dissenting); see also Harvard College Admissions, supra 
n. 190; N.Y. U. Admissions, supra n. 190; U.C.L.A. Undergraduate Admissions and Relations with 
Schools, supra n. 190; Binghamton U. Freshmen Information, supra n. 190. 
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court to strike down the regulation. 
If a state regulation interferes with a fundamental right, the courts 
must apply "strict scrutiny" to determine the constitutionality of the 
law. 206 Under such review, the state must show that the law was justified 
by a compelling state interest and that the means employed by the state 
were necessary to achieve the compelling state objective.207 The drug-
testing policies in Vernonia and Earls would have failed to meet this 
burden if the Court had previously recognized a fundamental right to a 
minimally adequate education that encompassed extracurricular 
activities. The policy would be struck down because there are several 
means of reducing drug use among schoolchildren that are less 
burdensome to the fundamental right. 208 
Drug policies like those in Earls and Vernonia should pass the first 
prong of "strict scrutiny" analysis because a state's interest in deterring 
drug use by schoolchildren may be fairly characterized as a compelling 
state interest.209 Such policies, however, are unacceptable under the 
second prong of judicial inquiry. While a school district's interest in 
deterring drug use may be considered compelling, a suspicionless drug-
testing regime that has the effect of turning away students, whether or 
not they use drugs, is not the least intrusive means of achieving its 
desired end.210 
In fact, such testing may actually undermine a district's effort to 
combat student drug use. Empirical studies reveal that those who are not 
involved in extracurricular activities are 49 percent more likely to have 
used drugs than those who are involved. 211 Thus, a school district seeking 
to decrease drug use among its students should be promoting student 
participation in extracurricular activities, not restricting access to them. 
There would be several ways to deter student drug use without 
infringing on a fundamental right to education. A school district, for 
example, could make an increased effort to encourage extracurricular 
involvement while implementing a drug education/prevention 
program.212 Extracurricular activities offer students a wide array of 
206. See Rodgiguez, 411 U.S at 17-19. 
207. Id. 
208. See Dunn, 405 U.S. at 343 ("[I] f there are other, reasonable ways to achieve [the 
compelling state interest] with a lesser burden on constitutionally protected activity, a State may not 
choose the way of greater interference. If it acts at all, it must choose 'less drastic means."') (quoting 
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479,488 (1960)). 
209. See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 661. 
210. The Earls majority acknowledged that there was not a tight tlt between testing students in 
extracurricular activities and solving the school's drug problems. 536 U.S. at 837-38. 
211. Zill, supra n. 4. 
212. There are additional alternatives, although some can be controversial, that can reduce 
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benefits,213 including decreasing the likelihood that participants will use 
drugs.214 As such, a school district should be promoting student 
participation in extracurricular activities instead of restricting access to 
them. A district might choose to offer a broader range of activities to 
appeal to more students. In addition, a district might encourage 
participation by holding award ceremonies to honor those who excel in 
each activity offered. 
A school district also has the option of infusing a drug prevention 
program into its curriculum. One effective plan is Project Alert, which 
focuses on preventing the use of alcohol, tobacco, and marijuana among 
middle school students. 215 The program curriculum seeks to modify 
norms about drug use, give students reasons not to use drugs, and teach 
students to build resistance skills.216 Students receiving the Project Alert 
curriculum are 30 percent less likely to start using marijuana.217 A drug 
prevention program like Project Alert offers a less burdensome 
alternative to mandatory drug testing to districts seeking to address 
substance abuse among their students. By implementing this method, 
schools would be combating drug use through education, rather than 
attempting to achieve that same goal by erecting barriers to student 
development. 
In sum, if the Supreme Court recognizes a federal fundamental right 
to a minimally adequate education that includes extracurricular activities, 
schoolchildren will have an effective means to challenge school policies 
that interfere with that right regardless of the state in which they attend 
school. While deterring drug use is a noble and compelling cause, a 
school district that wishes to do so must not unnecessarily infringe upon 
students' protected rights to a minimally adequate education. 
drug use among schoolchildren without infringing upon a child's right to a minimally adequate 
education. See Cal. Dept. of)., Creating a Drug Free Zone <http://www.stopdrugs.org/drugfreezone. 
html> (accessed Sept. 8, 2003) (discussing what drug free school zones are, why there should be such 
zones, and strategies for starting them); Libertarian Party, Should We Re-Legalize Drugs? 
<http://www.lp.org/issues/relegalize.html> (accessed )an. 14, 2004) (discussing how drug laws 
increase crime, make civil liberties suffer, and create a black market where organized crime 
prospers). 
213. Sec supra Part I. 
214. Zill, supra n. 4. 
215. See generally Project Alert: Substance Abuse Prevention that Works! 
<http://www.projectalert.best.org> (accessed Sept. 8, 2003). A plan known as Alert Plus is currently 
being developed I(Jr use in high schools. RAND Health, Research Highlights: Helping Adolescents 
Resist Drugs <http://www.rand.org/publications/RB/RB4518.1/> (accessed )an. 14, 2004). 
216. RAND Health, supra n. 215. 
217. See id. Project Alert Brochure <http://www.projectalert.best.org/pdfs/overview.pdf> 
(accessed )an. 15, 2004). The Project Alert curriculum also decreases marijuana use among those 
who have starting using by 60 percent. Id. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Extracurricular activities provide students with countless benefits,m 
yet a disturbing line of Supreme Court cases has allowed schools to 
restrict certain students' access to these vital educational opportunities.m 
Even so, the Court has specifically left open the question of whether there 
is some level of education that is protected by the Constitution.2211 In 
Lawrence v. Texas, the Court exhibited a new willingness to broaden the 
liberties deemed fundamental under the Due Process Clause.221 The right 
to a minimally adequate education should be deemed fundamental for 
two reasons. First, a fundamental right to education is implicit in several 
rights that are enumerated in the Constitution. 222 Second, the right may 
be considered "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition." 221 
The Lawrence decision shows that the Court is now more likely to 
recognize a fundamental right to a minimally adequate education. This 
right should encompass extracurricular activities, which play a significant 
role in a student's education. 224 If this fundamental right were 
recognized, policies such as those in Earls and Vernonia could be 
declared unconstitutional under a substantive due process challenge 
because such policies unnecessarily interfere with a student's 
fundamental right to a minimally adequate education.225 
Now is the time for the Supreme Court to recognize a fundamental 
right to a minimally adequate education so that the education of children 
in this country will be protected from the intrusions sanctioned and 
made possible by the Vernonia and Earls decisions. 
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